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Abstract—We present a novel approach to network security
against passive eavesdroppers by employing a configurable beam-
forming technique to create tightly defined regions of coverage for
targeted users. In contrast to conventional encryption methods,
our security scheme is developed at the physical layer by
configuring antenna array beam patterns to transmit the data
to specific regions. It is shown that this technique can effectively
reduce vulnerability of the physical regions to eavesdropping by
adapting the antenna configuration according to the intended
user’s channel state information. In this paper we present the
application of our concept to 802.11n networks where an antenna
array is employed at the access point, and consider the issue
of minimizing the coverage area of the region surrounding the
targeted user. A metric termed the exposure region is formally
defined and used to evaluate the level of security offered by this
technique. A range of antenna array configurations are examined
through analysis and simulation, and these are subsequently used
to obtain the optimum array configuration for a user traversing
a coverage area.
Keywords—Beamforming, exposure region(ER), IEEE 802.11n,
wireless security
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent wireless communication systems require signifi-
cantly high secrecy and privacy for transmission techniques.
The vast amount of connectivity between millions of user
devices and access points, where sensitive data is exchanged,
requires more protection than ever before. Conventional
encryption-based security has many limitations when used in
wireless networks. For example, current techniques used in
the 802.11 protocols such as WEP and WPA, are vulnerable
to many practical attacks [1]. As most conventional security
methods are designed to operate in layers other than the
physical layer, extra physical layer security will act as a
complementary approach to conventional encryption methods.
In this paper, we look at physical space security which is in
the scope of physical layer security.
A key threat in securing wireless networks is based around
the broadcast nature of radio transmissions. In a typical indoor
environment, a message sent to a legitimate user will be ex-
posed to any potential eavesdropper who is within range. The
principle of physical space security is to hide the knowledge of
the existence of the message from the eavesdropper rather than
encrypting the contents of the message from the eavesdropper
[2], [3].
In this context, beamforming can be used to restrict the
eavesdroppers’ access to the signals [2]–[6]. Beamforming is
traditionally used to optimize the system performance such as
data rate, reliability, range, etc. But here it is used to enhance
the signal strength by steering beams in the direction of
intended users, whilst suppressing the signal strength in other
directions by placing nulls thereby limiting the eavesdroppers’
signal strength.
In this paper, we develop a configurable beamforming tech-
nique to limit the eavesdropper’s ability to access the signals,
by adaptively changing the antenna configuration based on the
intended user’s channel state information (CSI). The CSI avail-
ability at the transmitter can be realized by a feedback channel
through which the estimated channel information is sent back
to the transmitter from the intended user. For indoor environ-
ments, channel conditions vary greatly for different scenarios.
For a typical indoor environment, the human walking speed is
very low, e.g. 1 m/s, resulting in a Doppler frequency shift of
just a few Hz, which has been shown in [7]; thus the channel
is assumed to be static during the packet transmission time [2].
In this paper, it is also assumed that the frequency-selective
fading is solved by orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM) incorporated in the 802.11 protocols [2], [3]. Under
these assumptions, the receiver’s CSI mainly depends on the
location. For example, in a log-distance channel model, the
path loss depends on the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver and other environment-related parameters. This
allows the transmitter to adapt to the channel based on the
location of the intended user per packet transmission. From
now on, we assume that the transmitter is aware of the location
of the intended user.
For a typical indoor scenario, Alice is the sender who
wishes to send a message to the intended receiver Bob and
Eve is a passive eavesdropper who listens to the channel and
attempts to overhear the message. In the context of an 802.11n
network, the access point (AP) equipped with an antenna array
acts as Alice. The downlink transmission from Alice to Bob
is to be protected, as shown in Fig. 1. Beamforming is used to
create a secure space around Bob, thus preventing Eve from
intercepting the signals if Eve is not inside the area. In [2], a
metric called exposure region (ER) was introduced to refer the
area within which an eavesdropper can access and decode the
signals being transmitted. However, an approximation model
to calculate the ER in [2] does not always reflect the true area,
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Fig. 1. A three-party communication model: Alice, Bob and Eve. The shadow
area surrounding Bob illustrates the ER.
as will be shown in Section V.
In this paper, we aim to minimize the ER based on the
received power that Bob can obtain being greater than or equal
to a target level. The received power of Bob can be adjusted
using beamforming with CSI at the transmitter. However, the
AP does not have knowledge of Eve, or of her CSI, thus
Eve could be located within the ER. In order to decrease the
possibility of Eve being able to receive the signal correctly,
the ER should be minimized. Our main contributions are:
• A more formal definition of ER with mathematical
expression which provides insights of the impacts of
related parameters including Bob’s location and the
array configuration.
• Formulation of the security problem about how to
achieve the minimum ER given Bob’s location.
• With analysis on the impacts of the parameters and
knowledge of Bob’s location, a configurable beam-
forming technique is proposed which allows the AP to
set the most appropriate configurations, i.e., number of
antenna elements and their spacing, such that the ER
is minimized in order to increase the level of security
offered.
• A new metric called the effective angle range (EAR)
within which the intended user can benefit from an
antenna array achieving a smaller ER than an omni-
directional antenna. By using the configurable beam-
forming technique, the EAR is widened.
One benefit of this approach is that it can be realized using
a single AP, thus it neither requires the coordination of multiple
APs thus avoiding special placement of the APs [2], [3], [8]
or synchronization of multiple APs across the network [4].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related
work on physical space security is discussed in Section II
and the differences from our work are stated. Then a more
formal definition of the ER is developed and the problem
description based on the definition is given in Section III. In
Section IV, the system model is introduced and a refinement
of the problem formulation is brought up based on our system
model. The analysis on the system parameters is given in
Section V and the configurable beamforming technique is
developed in Section VI. In Section VII, simulation shows
how the configurable beamforming technique works. Finally,
the conclusions and future work are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The idea of isolating a physical secure region with beam-
forming was first proposed in [4]. However, the concept of
physical space security as well as the metric ER was first
raised in [2], [3]. In [4], the eavesdroppers’ ability to access the
signals is limited by using multiple APs to transmit a complete
packet in a time-division manner. In [2], [3] three strategies
were proposed to reduce the ER with a group of arrays and a
central controller is used to coordinate the group of arrays.
Each array carries a different task, either beamforming or
jamming for different strategies. In [6], a hybrid protocol with
a public key encryption system was proposed based on the
work presented in [3]. The work in [5] focuses on creating a
fast-fading effect with a double-beam switching process on a
single AP to minimize the coverage area.
Instead of using beamforming, directional antennas were
utilized to achieve the spatial filtering effect of beamform-
ing [8], [9]. In [8], the idea proposed in [4] is realized
by deploying multiple APs to designated space sectors. The
authors in [9] have used directional antennas on both the AP
and the mobile user to obtain a minimum coverage area.
While the approaches in [2]–[4], [6], [8] focus on the
collaboration of multiple antenna arrays, our approach uses
beamforming on a single AP, which avoids a central controller
or modifications to the 802.11 protocols. Furthermore, there
are no special design requirements such as a public key encryp-
tion system and a special deployment of arrays. Our approach
minimizes the ER based on variable parameters including the
intended user’s location and the array configuration whereas
in [5] the optimization of the predicted coverage area is
investigated regardless of the intended user’s various locations.
In addition, while the calculation of the ER in [2], [3] is based
on an approximate geometric model, a more formal definition
in our paper by mathematical expression can provide better
insights into the system.
III. PHYSICAL SPACE SECURITY PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In the three-party communication model shown in Fig. 1,
the AP intends to communicate with Bob in the presence of
Eve. The AP is equipped with an antenna array, whilst it is
assumed that mobile devices only have a single antenna which
is the common setting in mobile phones. The downlink trans-
missions from Alice to Bob and Eve experience a multiple-
input-single-output (MISO) channel.
According to work in [2], [3], we define the ER as an
area where a general receiver has a received power above a
certain threshold power denoted by Pth. Here, we treat Eve
as a general receiver, because the AP is not aware of Eve’s
location. Pth can represent the level of the receiver sensitivity,
above which the receiver can correctly decode the signal being
transmitted. Let PrB and Pr denote the received power of Bob
and Eve, respectively. Then, the ER can be defined as
E = {p|Pr ≥ Pth}, (1)
where p denotes the location information of Eve. The security
level of the system can be evaluated by the area of the ER,
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Fig. 2. System model: an AP with a ULA on Y-axis with N = 4 elements
and ∆d spacing, Bob’s and Eve’s coordinates are (dB , θB) and (d, θ),
respectively
which is denoted by A = area(E). With Bob’s location pB
known at the AP, beamforming is used to focus the energy on
Bob. Thus, the area A is affected by Bob’s location pB .
However, it is not feasible to suppress the transmitted
energy at Eve’s location as Eve can be randomly located. To
lower the chance that Eve is inside the ER, the ER should
be minimized. The goal is to minimize the area of the ER A
according to Bob’s location pB on the condition that Bob’s
received power PrB must be guaranteed to be above the
threshold power Pth. Thus, the problem can be posed as
follows.
minA(pB)
s.t. PrB(pB) ≥ Pth (2)
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is shown in Fig. 2. We use a uniform
linear array (ULA) that contains a line of N antenna elements
with an equal spacing of ∆d. The elements of ULA as well as
the receive antennas are assumed to be omni-directional. It is
of interest to study the beamforming in a 2-D plane. Let Bob’s
location be denoted by pB = (dB , θB) and Eve’s location be
p = (d, θ); the values dB and d are the distances from the AP
to Bob and Eve, respectively; θB and θ are the angles for Bob
and Eve. In order to match the angles with polar coordinates,
the ULA is placed on the Y-axis with its middle point at the
origin point. As the AP is normally mounted on a wall, we
therefore study the angle range from −90◦ to 90◦.
A. Channel Model
The pass loss models used in the ITU indoor propagation
model [10] and the TGn channel model [11] are based on
the log-distance path loss model. Since log-distance path loss
models are based on the free-space path loss model, we
begin with the free-space path loss model to demonstrate the
effect of the configurable beamforming technique for simpler
mathematical modeling. The free-space path loss (dB) is given
by
PL(d) = 20log(4pid/λ). (3)
where λ is the wavelength of the carrier signal. For example,
in 802.11n standard, a carrier with a frequency of 2.4 GHz has
a wavelength of 0.125 m.
For a N×1 MISO channel, the channel gain vectors for
Bob and Eve are denoted by h = [h1, h2, . . . , hN ] and
g = [g1, g2, . . . , gN ], of which each element is a channel
gain denoted by hi or gi, i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , N ] and is composed
of two parts, an amplitude attenuation and a phase shift due
to the propagation delay. Since the path loss in (3) is the
power attenuation in logarithm scale, so the amplitude is
L(d) = 10−PL(d)/20. For example, gi can be written as
gi = L(di)e
jφi =
λ
4pidi
ejφi , (4)
where di is the distance between the ith antenna element and
the receiver’s antenna and φi is the phase shift. hi can be given
in a similar way.
The distances dB and d are normally regarded as far larger
than the array spacing, e.g. ∆d = 0.5λ. So the distances
between different antenna elements and the receiver’s antenna
can be considered as the same. In this case, the absolute phase
shift of each channel gain does not matter. The relative phase
shift (−2pi∆dsinθ/λ) between adjacent elements will decide
how different waves are added at an angle of θ [12]. Let the
first element in the array be the reference element as labeled
in Fig. 2. The channel gains hi and gi are written as follows.
hi =
λ
4pidB
e−j2pi(i−1)∆dsinθB/λ (5)
gi =
λ
4pid
e−j2pi(i−1)∆dsinθ/λ (6)
B. Refinement on Problem Formulation
The transmitted signal vector s = w · x, where x is the
modulated symbol with unit power and w is the beamforming
weight vector. The AP performs transmit beamforming, so
w = h†/||h||. h† denotes the conjugate transpose of h and
||h|| is the norm of h. Let Pt be the transmit power that
is assumed to be constant and set to an appropriate value
according to specific network plannings. Let n be the zero-
mean additive white Gaussian noise. The noise variance is
given according to room environment. In order to guarantee
a minimum received SNR, Pth is set according to the noise n.
The received signals of Bob and Eve are
rB =
√
Pt(h ·w)x+ n =
√
Pt||h||x+ n, (7)
r =
√
Pt(g ·w)x+ n =
√
Pt(gh
†/||h||)x+ n. (8)
The received signal power of Bob and Eve are
PrB = Pt||h||2 = NPt
(
λ
4pidB
)2
, (9)
Pr = Pt|gh†|2/||h||2 = Pt
(
λ
4pid
)2
1− cos(Nφ)
N(1− cosφ) , (10)
where φ = 2pi∆d(sinθB − sinθ)/λ.
It was demonstrated in Fig. 2 as well as the mathematical
expressions in (9) and (10) that there are two types of pa-
rameters, Bob’s location (dB , θB) and the array configuration
(N,∆d). In our system, Bob’s location is known at the AP,
therefore, only the array configuration (N,∆d) is adjustable.
In addition, according to (9), PrB does not depend on θB
and ∆d; according to (10), Pr does not depend on dB . In
other words, the ER is determined by (θB , N,∆d) and PrB is
determined by (dB , N).
It is worth noting that N should not exceed the maximum
number of antenna elements Nmax. Although there is no
restraint on ∆d, it is normally no less than 0.5λ and takes
an integer multiple of 0.5λ. Therefore, the problem can be
re-formulated as follows from (2).
min
N,∆d
A(θB , N,∆d)
s.t.
Pth
Pt
(
4pidB
λ
)2
≤ N ≤ Nmax
and
1
2
λ ≤ ∆d ≤ Nmax − 1
2
λ (11)
V. ER ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the impacts of the parameters
mentioned in (11). To begin with, Pr in the ER expression
in (1) is substituted by (10).
E(θB , N,∆d) ={
(d, θ)|Pt
(
λ
4pid
)2
1− cos[Nφ(θ, θB ,∆d)]
N [1− cosφ(θ, θB ,∆d)] > Pth
}
,
(12)
where φ(θ, θB ,∆d) = 2pi∆d(sinθB − sinθ)/λ.
The ER of an antenna array is similar to the array pattern,
except that path loss is incorporated in the ER. It is enclosed
by a boundary D(θ, θB , N,∆d). From the inequality in (12),
we can derive
D(θ, θB , N,∆d) =
√(
λ
4pi
)2
Pt
Pth
1− cos[Nφ(θ, θB ,∆d)]
N [1− cosφ(θ, θB ,∆d)] .
(13)
The area of a circular sector with a radius of a and a central
angle of Θ is 12a
2Θ. The ER can be divided into an infinite
number of infinitely narrow sectors. Thus, the area A can be
calculated by the following integral.
A(θB , N,∆d) =
∫ pi/2
−pi/2
1
2
D(θ, θB , N,∆d)
2 dθ
=
1
2
(
λ
4pi
)2
Pt
Pth
∫ pi/2
−pi/2
1− cos[Nφ(θ, θB ,∆d)]
N [1− cosφ(θ, θB ,∆d)] dθ (14)
Whilst there is no analytical solution for this integral, it can
be calculated numerically. It is easy to obtain that dB does
not affect A from (14) and that the lower bound of N is
proportional to d2B from (11). In the following, we will only
investigate the impacts of θB and (N,∆d) on A.
A. Impact of θB
In order to study the impact of θB , the other parameters
are fixed. Examples of the ER are plotted for θB = 0◦, 30◦,
60◦ in Fig. 3. The transmit power is Pt = 10 dBm, which is
set according to commonly used commercial products and the
threshold power is Pth = −80 dBm. For example, if the noise
variance is −100 dBm, the minimum signal-to-noise ratio in
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Fig. 3. ERs for different θB . Other parameters are Pt = 10 dBm, Pth =
−80 dBm, N = 4 and ∆d = 0.5λ
the ER is 20 dB. (N = 4,∆d = 0.5λ) is used for the antenna
configuration. In Fig. 3, the maximum coverage distance is
normalized to one. Similar to the array pattern, the shape of
the ER varies as θB increases from 0◦ to 90◦. For example,
when θB is 60◦, the side lobe is too large to be ignored. Thus,
the approximation used in [2], [3] does not always reflect the
true area.
In this paper, A is normalized to A0 for the purpose of
comparing the antenna array with an omni-directional antenna
in terms of security. A0 is the area of the ER when only one
element in the array is transmitting. For a fair comparison,
other parameters are the same for calculating A and A0.
Moreover, A0 is fixed if Pt is a fixed value. Due to the
symmetry of the antenna array, we only show the results for
θB from 0◦ to 90◦. The ratio for the entire range from 0◦ to
360◦ can be obtained in the same way.
The curve in Fig. 4 shows two things. First, the area A
changes as Bob moves around. Second, when θB > 41◦,
the ER of an antenna array is larger than that of an omni-
directional antenna. The EAR is defined as the angle range
where the ratio is less than one, which indicates where the
antenna array outperforms an omni-directional antenna in
terms of security. In Fig. 4, the EAR is from 0◦ to 41◦.
B. Impact of (N,∆d)
For fixed (N,∆d), A changes with θB according to
Section V-A. For a fixed θB , A also changes with different
(N,∆d) combinations as shown in Fig. 5. The parameters
used are θB = 0◦, Pt = 10 dBm, and Pth = −80 dBm.
The maximum coverage distance is normalized to one. By
comparing different N for the same ∆d or comparing different
∆d for the same N , the variations in the ER over a range of
these parameters can be obtained. However, there is no obvious
solution in deciding which (N,∆d) is optimal. In Section VI,
we will propose an algorithm to deal with this problem.
VI. THE CONFIGURABLE BEAMFORMING TECHNIQUE
For an array with a maximum number Nmax of elements
and ∆dmin spacing, there are many possible (N,∆d) com-
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Fig. 4. Impact of θB on A/A0. Other parameters are Pt = 10 dBm, Pth =
−80 dBm, N = 4 and ∆d = 0.5λ
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Fig. 5. ERs for different (N,∆d). Other parameters are θB = 0◦, Pt =
10 dBm, Pth = −80 dBm
binations. There must exist at least one (N,∆d) combination
for given (dB , θB), which gives the optimal solution for (11).
In order to find the optimum (N,∆d), we will build a
look-up table T based on (dB , θB) for practical use rather
than obtaining the best solution by taking the derivative of
A(θB , N,∆d). The algorithm is shown below. First, a table T0
containing all possible (N,∆d) is required. Then we need to
divide the space into sectors by choosing an appropriate angle
resolution of α (line 1-2) and find the optimum (N,∆d) for
each sector (line 3-21). We consider scenarios such as when Pt
is not large enough or Bob is too far away. In these cases, AP
may need more than one antenna to increase PrB (line 7-11).
However, we assume that Bob is within the coverage range of
the AP, i.e., the AP can always cover Bob’s location by using
an appropriate array configuration.
Require: A configuration table T0 with L possible (N,∆d)
1: Assign a valid value in radian to α
2: M ← d pi2αe
3: Create an empty table T with 2×(2M+1) cells
4: for i = −M to M do
5: if −pi2 ≤ iα ≤ pi2 then
TABLE I. A CONFIGURATION TABLE T0 FOR A 4-ELEMENT ANTENNA
ARRAY WITH 0.5λ SPACING.
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
(N,∆d/λ) (1,-) (2,0.5) (3,0.5) (4,0.5) (2,1) (2,1.5)
6: Create an index vector u = [1, 2, . . . , L]
7: for j = 1 to L do
8: if PrB(dB , T0(j)) < Pth then
9: Delete the jth element from u
10: end if
11: end for
12: K ← No. of elements of u
13: Create an all-zero vector v with a length of K
14: for k = 1 to K do
15: v(k)← A(iα, T0(u(k)))
16: end for
17: Find idx that corresponds to minv
18: T (1, i)← iα
19: T (2, i)← T0(u(idx))
20: end if
21: end for
For a given (dB , θB), the AP chooses the most closely
matched cell in T and uses the corresponding (N,∆d). The
chosen N elements are used and the rest remain silent. In
practice, the AP could scan the room and update the look-up
table to adapt to Bob’s location. A smaller α will give more
accurate result, but require more measurements, which will
increase the implementation complexity in the AP as well as
the processing time.
VII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present simulation results to illustrate
how the configurable beamforming technique in Section VI
works. In order to show all (N,∆d) combinations, we consider
a scenario where Bob is inside the coverage range of the AP
even when the AP uses an omni-directional antenna. Therefore,
N can take any integer value between 1 and Nmax in (11).
The AP is equipped with a 4-element antenna array
(Nmax = 4) with an equal spacing of 0.5λ (∆dmin = 0.5λ).
Possible combinations are listed in the configuration table T0,
as shown in Table I. There are two types of combinations. One
is to increase N from 2 to 4 while keeping ∆d = 0.5λ. The
other kind is to increase ∆d from 0.5λ to 1.5λ while keeping
N = 2. For Nmax is 4, there exists no intermediate combi-
nations such as (N = 3, ∆d = 1λ). However, when Nmax is
increased, various combinations will appear. In addition, there
is one cell in T0 for the omni-directional antenna case.
For this simulation, the carrier frequency is 2.4 GHz, so the
wavelength λ is 0.125 m. The transmit power is Pt = 10 dBm
and the threshold power is Pth = −80 dBm. The area of the
ER when the AP transmits with only one antenna is denoted
by A0. Because Pt is fixed, A0 is constant. For a comparison
with an omni-directional antenna, the ratio of A to A0 is used.
Fig. 6 shows the ratio of A to A0 for six (N,∆d)
combinations that correspond to T0. Each dashed curve cor-
responds to one particular antenna configuration. For different
antenna configuration (N,∆d), the ratio A/A0 varies with θB
differently.
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Fig. 6. A versus θW for different (N,∆d) combinations.
TABLE II. A LOOK-UP TABLE T
θB (N,∆d/λ) θB (N,∆d/λ) θB (N,∆d/λ)
0◦ (4,0.5) 35◦ (2,1) 70◦ (1,-)
5◦ (4,0.5) 40◦ (2,1.5) 75◦ (1,-)
10◦ (4,0.5) 45◦ (2,1.5) 80◦ (1,-)
15◦ (3,0.5) 50◦ (2,1.5) 85◦ (1,-)
20◦ (3,0.5) 55◦ (2,1.5) 90◦ (1,-)
25◦ (4,0.5) 60◦ (1,-)
30◦ (4,0.5),(2,1) 65◦ (1,-)
The angle resolution α is set to 5◦. The calculations are to
be done for θB ∈ [0◦, 5◦, 10◦, . . . , 90◦]. For each angle, there
are six values of A/A0. The minimum value is chosen and the
corresponding (N,∆d) is recorded in the look-up table T in
Table II. The optimum solution is shown by the solid curve in
Fig. 6. Based on Bob’s angle, the most closely matched cell
in T is chosen, which will give a minimum ER. The chosen
antenna elements are used to transmit signals while the others
stay silent. For example, when Bob’s angle is 18.5◦, the best
match is 20◦ and the optimum combination is (N = 3,∆d =
0.5λ).
As shown in Fig. 6, the EAR is from 0◦ to 57◦. To achieve
the minimum ER, the AP uses multiple antennas when Bob’s
angle is within the EAR, whereas the AP uses an omni-
directional antenna when Bob’s angle is outside the EAR.
Based on the observation of T , it can be inferred that as θB
increases, the best solution uses a fewer number of elements
and a larger spacing except for θB = 25◦.
By using the configurable beamforming technique, the
EAR is increased up to 57◦, compared with the EAR for a cer-
tain (N,∆d). For example, the EAR for (N = 4,∆d = 0.5λ)
is from 0◦ to 41◦. Therefore, the configurable beamforming
technique not only minimizes the ER for a given location of
Bob but also increases the EAR.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a new approach to physical space
security in wireless networks that is obtained by the creation
of specific regions of wireless reception around targeted users.
The objective is to minimize the size of the ER. A novel
solution using a configurable beamforming technique has been
developed which only needs to be applied to a single AP. To
this end, the mathematical expression for the ER was derived
based on our system model. Through analysis and simulations,
it is shown that the proposed technique is successful at
optimizing the array configuration, i.e. the number of elements
and their spacing, based on the intended user’s location to
achieve a minimum ER and increasing the EAR.
For future work, we intend to implement the system on
hardware and test it in the real environment to substantiate
the expected results. Furthermore, we plan to investigate
approaches by which the transmitter can acquire the channel
knowledge and evaluate the impact of the estimation errors of
channel information.
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